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Abstract
This study investigates how the supply of foreign
labor in virtual versus physical markets responds to
monetary incentives using information on digital labor
flows from a major global online labor platform for IT
services in conjunction with data on physical labor
flows into the United States. We use exogenous
changes in the exchange rate as a source of
identification: a depreciation of a country’s currency
against the US dollar exogenously increases the
incentives of its workers to seek employment in the
United States. Our results suggest that monetary
incentives, measured as a depreciation of a country’s
currency against the US dollar, have a substantial
impact on the supply of foreign labor in virtual
markets. However, we do not find that monetary
incentives have a statistically significant impact on the
supply of foreign labor in physical markets, which
might be expected since physical migration faces
substantial bureaucratic restrictions and transaction
costs.

1. Introduction
Legal barriers to migration block massive
efficiency enhancing migration flows from poor to
rich countries, and arguably represent one of the
greatest inefficiencies in the global economy. The
economic losses due to migration restrictions have
been estimated to range between 20 and 60 percent of
the global GDP, a magnitude that is one or two orders
of magnitude larger than the combined economic
losses due to the barriers to trade and capital flows [1].
The sheer size of these inefficiencies reveals that even
small migration flows are capable of having
significant efficiency gains.
Online markets often escape the rules of traditional
markets and have their own alternate reality. For
instance, consumers can avoid paying sales taxes
when they make online purchases from websites that
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do not have a physical store in their states, and
international workers and firms can sometimes
circumvent the legal barriers to physical migration and
engage in remote working relationships with foreign
partners. Our primary objective in this paper is to
investigate how elastic the supply of foreign labor in
the digital world is to changes in income. Since
foreigners can work for American employers either by
engaging in virtual working relationships with
American employers or by physically immigrating
into the United States, we also study how the income
elasticity of the labor supply in virtual markets
compares with the income elasticity of physical labor
flows into the United States.
Addressing these questions requires the use of data
on both the supply of labor in virtual markets and
physical labor flows, and the existence of an
exogenous shock affecting the pecuniary incentives of
foreigners to seek employment from American
employers. In this paper, we use just such a data set on
virtual and physical labor flows into the United States,
and we employ the change in the exchange rate as an
exogenous shock affecting workers’ virtual labor
supply functions and physical migration incentives.
Specifically, a depreciation of a country’s exchange
rate against the US dollar increases foreign workers’
incentives to engage in virtual working relationships
with employers in the United States, since a
depreciation of a foreign country’s exchange rate
implies that a given monetary compensation
denominated in US dollars represents a higher
monetary compensation measured in the foreign
worker’s domestic currency. Similarly, a depreciation
of the of a country’s exchange rate against the US
dollar increases foreign workers’ incentives to
physically migrate and seek employment in the United
States, since transfers of money to migrants’ own
countries (i.e., remittances) and wealth accumulation
for the return (i.e., return savings) are known to drive
physical migration [2-4].
Although migration indisputably increases global
economic efficiency, migration flows can also create
winners and losers. It is therefore not surprising that
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there has been a substantial amount of research and
political controversy regarding how traditional
physical migration and offshoring activities to other
countries affect local labor markets. On the one hand,
both hiring immigrants and offshoring can reduce the
demand for domestic workers via a direct substitution
effect [5-7]. On the other hand, hiring immigrants and
offshoring may reduce production costs and increase
production efficiency, leading to an increase in the
demand for domestic workers [8, 9]. While the
academic research as well as the political controversy
on this topic has focused on traditional physical
migration flows, the fast growth in virtual migration
that is currently taking place will shortly bring online
labor markets under scrutiny.
Early research focusing on online labor markets
predicted that the Internet facilitates the exchange of
labor by reducing search and transaction costs [10] and
increasing both labor demand and supply, which may
result in increased match quality and efficiency [11].
It has been, however, more recent that the proliferation
of online labor platforms (e.g., Upwork, Freelancer,
Zhubajie/Witmart) has given birth to an actively
growing literature empirically studying online labor
markets. Our paper contributes most directly to this
empirical literature on online labor markets.
Some studies in this empirical literature focus on
analyzing how various types of information, quality
signals, and worker characteristics affect employers’
hiring decisions (e.g., Gefen and Carmel [12], Lin et
al. [13], Moreno and Terwiesch [14], and Pallais [15]
focused on the role of reputation systems; Agrawal et
al. [16] and Pallais [15] on the role of worker
experience; Stanton and Thomas [17] on agency
affiliation; Chan and Wang [18] on the role of gender;
and Ghani et al. [19] on the role of ethnicity).
Another stream of papers in this literature analyzes
worker behavior in online labor platforms (e.g., Chen
and Horton [20] found that workers respond to wage
cuts by quitting; Snir and Hitt [21] found excessive
bidding; and Moreno and Terwiesch [14] found that
workers increase their reservation wages when their
reputation scores improve).
Finally, some studies analyze the role of
geographic and cultural differences in online labor
markets (e.g., Gefen and Carmel [12] analyzed
employer behavior in online labor markets finding that
employers prefer domestic workers; Agrawal et al.
[16] found that freelancers from developing countries
have a lower winning probability compared with
similar freelancers from developed countries; Hong
and Pavlou [22] examined how differences in
language, culture, and time zone affect employers'
hiring choices; and Gong [23] examined the role of
geographic and economic differences in the matching

between workers and employers). Our paper
contributes to this empirical literature by studying
global digital labor flows and comparing the
differences in how pecuniary motivation affects
virtual versus physical labor flows.

2. Background and hypotheses
Although world-wide surveys report that vast
numbers of people express desire to physically migrate
from poor to rich countries, only approximately 220
million people (accounting for 3.3 percent of the
world’s population) lived outside their countries of
origin in 2015 [24].
Prior research shows that policy barriers to global
physical labor mobility play a critical role in
restricting the migration of labor across borders, and
that the restrictions to physical migration from lowwage to high-wage countries are a contender for the
title of creating the single greatest economic
inefficiency in the global economy [1]. Because
virtual labor flows are not accounted for when
estimating the size of these inefficiencies, and virtual
labor flows have the potential to alleviate the massive
costs due to the restrictions to physical migration [25],
measuring the size of the income elasticity of the
supply of foreign labor in virtual versus physical
markets is important. Moreover, our study is also
timely, owing to the current political controversy in
the United States concerning immigration.
Our study focuses on studying immigration into
the United States, which adopts an employer-driven
program to regulate the employment of foreign
workers [3, 25]. For example, the H-1B nonimmigrant
visa program allows U.S. employers to temporally
recruit foreign workers in “specialty occupations,”
defined as positions that typically require specialized
knowledge and attainment of a bachelor’s or higher
degree. In addition, in an attempt to protect domestic
workers, employers are required to pay the foreign
worker the higher of the actual or prevailing wage for
the position. Since 2004, the statutory cap is 65,000
new visas per year, in addition to 20,000 visas under
the advanced degree exemption. However, compared
to the annual cap, the number of H-1B petitions filed
each year is much higher. For the 2018 fiscal year,
USCIS received 199,000 H-1B petitions, and the
annual cap was filled within the first week of the filing
period.
Due to these policy barriers to physical labor
mobility, we expect that the supply of labor in the
physical world to be relatively inelastic to intertemporal variations in monetary incentives.
Specifically, due to the policy restrictions that the
United States imposes on its employment-based
Page 5157

immigration programs (e.g., the H-1B visa program)
and the lengthy process it takes for a foreign worker to
obtain a work visa permit, we expect that the supply of
foreign labor into the United States would be relatively
inelastic to inter-temporal variations in monetary
incentives.
Conversely, our expectation is that online labor
platforms can circumvent the policy barriers to
physical migration [25] and reduce search and
transaction costs [10]. On online labor platforms such
as Upwork and Freelancer, foreign workers can
engage in virtual working relationships with American
employers without the need to acquire temporary work
visa permits from the U.S. government. Therefore, we
expect that, virtual labor flows are more elastic to
inter-temporal variations in monetary incentives, and
more specifically, to fluctuations in bilateral exchange
rates.
Comparing the size of the elasticities of the supply
of foreign labor in physical versus virtual markets
provides information about the stringency of the
restrictions to physical and virtual labor flows. These
estimates also serve as ingredients to measure the
inefficiency costs due to the restrictions to physical
migration and to gauge the extent to which virtual
labor flows can alleviate these inefficiencies.

3. Data and context
In our empirical analysis, we use a proprietary
database from a major global online labor platform for
IT services containing information on labor flows in
the digital world. 1 The focal online labor platform
serves as an intermediary that connects employers and
potential workers for IT service projects, which are
typically small or medium sized projects. The platform
uses a reverse auction mechanism, where employers
solicit bids by posting project descriptions and
workers submit bids by specifying a dollar amount to
complete the project.2 When the bidding period ends,
employers evaluate all the bids and choose a winning
worker to complete the project. Employers choose the
winning worker based on the dollar amount and other
factors such as experience, certification, or prior
ratings.
The raw dataset includes data on all projects posted
between February 2004 and September 2010.
Specifically, we observe detailed information on all
1

www.Freelancer.com
Sellers submit bids in reverse auctions, unlike ordinary auctions
where buyers submit bids. Note that in our context workers are the
sellers and employers are the buyers.
2

3

https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/ert/GUI/Pages/CountryDataBa
se.aspx

projects: employers who posted those projects, bids,
workers, and winning workers. In this study, we focus
on employers located in the United States, since it is
where the majority of the employers are located. Using
the raw data, we construct a panel dataset that includes
information on counts of monthly country-level
“digital” labor flows into to the Unites States, which
we measured by counting the country-level number of
workers’ bids to job postings by employers in the
United States. Our database includes information on
monthly virtual country-level labor flows into the
United States from 91 countries (7,280 country-month
level observations).
Our examination of how the virtual labor supply
responds to changes in monetary incentives leverages
exogenous changes in the exchange rate as a source of
identification. The rationale behind using the
exchange rate as a source of identification is that
changes in the exchange rate are likely to affect
workers’ labor supply decisions. For example, when
the US dollar appreciates relative to Indian Rupee,
Indian workers may have higher incentives to work for
U.S. employers since they would now receive a higher
monetary compensation. Moreover, changes in the
exchange rate are unlikely to be affected by the virtual
labor supply (i.e., exogenous). For our study, we
obtained information on the nominal exchange rates
from the International Monetary Fund. 3 Because we
are interested in measuring the effect of a currency
devaluation while holding workers’ countries price
levels fixed, we need information on the evolution of
the price index, which we also obtained from the
International Monetary Fund.4
In addition to examining how virtual labor flows
respond to changes in monetary compensation, we are
interested in studying how changes in monetary
compensation affect physical migration flows. There
are a few important data challenges in studying this
question. For example, a fraction of the immigration
into the United States is illegal and data on illegal
immigration into the United States by country of
origin are not available. In our empirical analysis, we
use data on the number of temporary nonimmigrant
workers5 into the United States by country of origin
from the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics published
by the Department of Homeland Security.6 We believe
using data on temporary nonimmigrant workers is
preferred to using data on permanent immigrants
4

http://data.imf.org/?sk=5DABAFF2-C5AD-4D27-A1751253419C02D1
5
The Department of Homeland Security defines the following
classifications as temporary nonimmigrant workers: E1 to E3, H1B,
H1B, H1C, H2A, H2B, H2R, H3, H4, I1, L1, L2, O1 to O3, P1 to
P4, Q1, R1, R2, TD, and TN.
6
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook
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because temporary workers are more likely to respond
quickly to a change in monetary compensation (e.g.,
obtaining a permanent resident status takes a long time
and is unlikely to respond quickly to a change in the
exchange rate). Further, our data on physical migration
are not as granular as our digital migration data and are
only available at the country-year level instead of the
country-month level.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our data on
digital labor flows. Our data on digital labor flows
contain a total of 7,280 observations, but our
regressions below use a subsample sample of 4,910
observations which have complete information on the
exchange rate and price level.7 The mean number of
bids amounts to 532.1 in the entire sample and 729.9

in the regression subsample. The standard deviations
in Table 1 reveal wide variation in the number of bids
across observations. This wide variation in the data is
driven by variation both within and between countries.
Table 1 also shows wide variations in the exchange
rate and CPI, but the variation in these variables is
mostly driven by variation in the data between
countries. However, some countries in the sample
experienced large fluctuations in the exchange rate.
For example, the South African currency (the ZAR)
experienced a sudden appreciation in 2008, from 8.06
ZAR per USD in October 2008 to 9.74 ZAR per USD
in November 2008 (a 21% increase within a month).
Figure 1 presents two examples of countries
experiencing large fluctuations in the exchange rate.

Table 1. Digital migration: summary statistics
Variable
Obs
Mean
SD
Full Sample
Number of Bids
7,280
532.101 3230.209
log (Worker Country Currency per USD)
6,852
1.289
2.123
log (Worker Country CPI)
5,292
4.475
0.140
Estimation Sample
Number of Bids
4,910
729.934 3901.180
log (Worker Country Currency per USD)
4,910
1.605
2.270
log (Worker Country CPI)
4,910
4.477
0.143
Table 2. Physical migration: summary statistics
Obs
Mean
SD
Full Sample
Number of Temporary Workers
361
21508.900 53363.250
log (Worker Country Currency per USD)
355
1.662
2.328
log (Worker Country CPI)
341
4.478
0.123
Estimation Sample
Number of Temporary Workers
330
22679.240 55523.390
log (Worker Country Currency per USD)
330
1.656
2.333
log (Worker Country CPI)
330
4.479
0.124
Variable

Min

Max

0
-2.077
3.696

54536
9.380
4.674

0
-2.077
3.696

54536
9.380
4.674

Min

Max

3
360903
-1.314 9.249
3.883
4.680
3
360903
-1.314 9.249
3.883
4.680

Table 2 presents information on physical labor
flows. The mean number of temporary workers
entering the United States amounts to 21,508.9 in the
entire sample and 22,679.2 in the regression

subsample.8 Similar to the data in digital labor flows,
the data on physical labor flows in Table 2 show wide
variation across observations.

7

8

This estimation sample contains information from 70 countries,
including United Arab Emirates, Austria, Belgium, Bahrain, Brazil,
Brunei, Bhutan, Botswana, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Colombia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Algeria, Ecuador,
Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Haiti, Hungary,
Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait,
Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Mexico, Malta,
Mauritius, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Nepal, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, El Salvador, San Marino,
Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay,
United States, Venezuela, and South Africa.

This estimation sample contains information from 69 countries,
including United Arab Emirates, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bahrain, Brazil, Brunei, Bhutan, Botswana, Canada, Switzerland,
Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark,
Algeria, Ecuador, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, UK, Greece,
Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Iceland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Kuwait, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia,
Mexico, Malta, Mauritius, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands,
Norway, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, El
Salvador, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia,
Uruguay, Venezuela, and South Africa.
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Figure 1. Examples of countries experiencing
large currency fluctuations

4. Model
Our objective in this paper is to study the
sensitivity of the supply of labor in virtual and physical
markets to monetary compensation changes. One
empirical identification strategy to investigate the
elasticity of the supply of labor in virtual markets is to
examine the behavior of workers who reside abroad
and seek to engage in working relationships with
employers in the United States. Specifically, we can
use the following fixed effects model:
Number of Bidsi,USA,t
=β0
+β1 Monetary Incentive to Offer Labor Servicesi,USA,t
+αPrice Indexit
+σi,USA +ωt +εi,USA,t
(1)
where i represents a country, and t represents a month.
The dependent variable Number of Bidsi, USA,t
represents the number of bids from workers in country
i to job postings from employers in the United States
in
month
t.
The
independent
variable
Monetary Incentive to Offer Labor Servicesi,USA,t
represents the monetary incentive to virtually offer
their labor services for workers living in country i to

jobs postings from employers in the United States in
month t. The independent variable Price Indexit
represents the price level in the worker’s country i in
month t. The variable σi,USA represents a worker
country fixed effect, ωt represents a month fixed
effect, and εi,USA,t represents the error.
While Model (1) cannot be estimated because the
monetary incentive to offer labor services for workers
in country i to the United States is unobservable, we
can assume the following relationship:
Monetary Incentive to Offer Labor Servicesi,USA,t
=a1 Nominal Exchange Ratei,USA,t
(2)
which assumes that the monetary incentive to offer
labor services to employers in the United States for a
worker living in country i increases with an increase in
the nominal exchange rate between country i and the
United States (i.e., an increase in the number of units
of the worker’s domestic currency per US dollar).
Therefore, our model hypothesizes that the incentives
of a worker in any given country to work for an
employer located in the United States would increase
when the US dollars paid by the employer can buy
more units of the foreign worker’s domestic currency.
Substituting (2) into (1) we get an expression that
we can estimate with our available data:
Number of Bidsi,USA,t
=β0
+π1 Nominal Exchange Ratei,USA,t
+αPrice Indexit
+σi,USA +ωt +εi,USA,t
(3)
Note that our model controls for the evolution of
the price index in the worker’s country. This is
important because it implies that the coefficient π1 in
Model (3) measures the effect of a devaluation of the
worker’s domestic currency (an increase in the number
of units of the worker’s domestic currency per US
dollar), holding fixed the price level in the worker’s
country. Thus, the coefficient π1 in Model (3)
measures the effect of a real increase in the worker’s
purchasing power.
In our empirical analysis below, we present
regression results excluding and including fixed
effects by worker country and year-month. Model (3)
does not include additional covariates. This is in part
because there is a practical data availability limitation
of finding data at the monthly level for a large number
of countries. More importantly, when our model
includes worker country fixed effects 𝜎𝑖,𝑈𝑆𝐴 , these
fixed effects account for time-invariant country level
unobservable characteristics such country sizes,
language, or cultural traits. The inclusion of worker
country fixed effects in our model also controls for
worker-employer country-pair (country i and the
USA) time invariant factors such as the geographical
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proximity, the proximity in cultural traits (e.g.,
language, religion), and the time difference between
the worker’s country and the United States. The yearmonth fixed effects ωt in our model account for nonparametric time trends in the number of bids.
In this paper, we are also interested in comparing
the sensitivity of the supply of labor to monetary
compensation changes in virtual versus physical
markets. We study physical migration by using the
following model:
Number of Temp Workersi,USA,y
=β0
+π1 Nominal Exchange Ratei,USA,y
+αPrice Indexiy
+σi,USA +ωy +εi,USA,y
(4)
which is similar to Model (3) but has two notable
differences. First, in Model (4), the dependent variable
measures the number of temporary workers from
country i into the United States per year. Second, the
data availability limitations restrict our analysis to the
yearly level for physical migration.
The dependent variables in our model are count
variables that have a substantial proportion of zeros. In
our setting, the advantages of using Poisson regression
over using OLS regression with a log-transformed
dependent variable are well known [26]. As pointed
out by O’Hara and Kotze [27], an OLS estimator with
log-transformed dependent variable would result in
severely biased estimates, especially when in the
presence of heteroscedasticity [28]. Because our
model contains fixed effects, we use a Poisson pseudomaximum likelihood (PPML) estimator [28, 29] that

has been widely used in studies with count panel data
[30-32], and offers several benefits over other
estimators such as a fixed effect negative binomial
[33]. An additional advantage of the PPML estimator
is that it does not impose an equi-dispersion condition
(a condition that is imposed by the standard Poisson
estimator [34]), making the estimator suitable even in
the presence of over-dispersion. The use of PPML also
facilitates a valid inference because it allows the
estimation of clustered standard errors allowing for
heteroskedasticity across countries and serial
correlation within workers’ countries.

5. Empirical results
5.1. Digital labor flows
Table 3 presents estimation results of our empirical
model measuring digital labor flows, excluding
(Column 1) and including (Column 2) fixed effects by
worker-country and year-month. The number of
workers’ bids is measured as a count variable and the
exchange rate is measured in logarithms. Because our
regressions control for the evolution of the price index
within workers’ countries, the coefficient estimate on
the exchange rate variable measures how currency
devaluations in workers’ countries affect digital labor
flows while holding fixed the price levels within
workers’ countries. The standard errors are clustered
at the worker country level to allow for
heteroskedasticity across countries and for serial
correlation within workers’ countries.

Table 3. How monetary incentives affect digital migration
(1)
(2)
VARIABLES
Number of Bids
Number of Bids
log (Worker Country Currency per USD)
0.190**
0.894*
(0.0812)
(0.538)
log (Worker Country CPI)
0.418
0.898**
(0.951)
(0.369)
Observations
4,910
4,909
(Pseudo) R-squared
0.0502
0.995
Worker Country FE
No
Yes
Year-Month FE
No
Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the worker-country level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results in both Columns 1 and 2 suggest that a
devaluation of a country’s currency increases the
number of bids from its domestic workers to job
postings from employers in the United States (i.e.,
digital labor flows into the United States), as expected.
The estimation results in Columns 1 and 2, however,
have substantially different implications in terms of

the size of the estimated digital migration effect.
Because we estimate a Poisson regression model and
we measure the exchange rate variable in logarithms,
the estimated coefficient on the exchange rate variable
(approximately) represents an elasticity. While the
results in Column 1 of Table 3 suggest that a
devaluation of 100% of a country’s currency increases
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digital labor flows by approximately 19%, the more
reliable results in Column 2 of Table 3, including fixed
effects by worker-country and year-month, suggest
that a 100% devaluation of a country’s currency
increases digital labor flows by approximately 89%.
As we explained before, in our regressions, we
control for the evolution of the price index within
workers’ countries because we are interested in
measuring the effect of a currency devaluation while
holding workers’ countries price levels fixed. The
estimated coefficient on the price index variable itself
is positive, which may be due to income effects since
high inflation is known to be positively correlated with
poor conditions in the labor market [35]. Workers
from countries facing poor labor market conditions
may be forced to seek employment opportunities
abroad.
We explained before that our model does not
include additional covariates because fixed effects
regression models do not allow for the inclusion of
time-invariant country-level control variables (e.g.,
country sizes, language, or cultural traits). 9 We also
explained, however, that the inclusion of fixed effects
by worker-country controls for all these country-level
time invariant factors and worker-employer countrypair time invariant factors such as the geographic or

cultural proximity between the worker and employer
countries. We also explained before how the inclusion
of fixed effects by year-month accounts for time trends
(note that the pseudo R-squared amounts to 0.995).
Thus, we believe our model serves our goal of
identifying how sensitive the supply of labor in virtual
markets is to changes in the monetary compensation.

5.2. Physical labor flows
Table 4 presents estimation results of our empirical
model measuring physical labor flows, excluding
(Column 1) and including (Column 2) fixed effects by
worker-country and year. Note that our data on
physical labor flows are more limited than our data on
digital labor flows because physical labor flows are
measured at the year and not at the month level.
Similar to Table 3, Table 4 measures the number of
temporary workers moving to the United States as a
count variable and the exchange rate in logarithms,
and thus the coefficient on the exchange rate variable
(approximately) represents an elasticity. Also, similar
to Table 3, the standard errors in Table 4 are clustered
at the worker country level.

Table 4. How monetary incentives affect physical migration
(1)
(2)
VARIABLES
Number of
Number of
Temporary Workers Temporary Workers
log (Worker Country Currency per USD)
0.0728
0.770
(0.0864)
(0.613)
log (Worker Country CPI)
1.487
1.055*
(2.293)
(0.554)
Observations
330
293
(Pseudo) R-squared
0.0133
0.982
Worker Country FE
No
Yes
Year FE
No
Yes
Robust standard errors clustered at the worker-country level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results in both Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4
suggest a devaluation of a country’s currency does not
have a statistically significant impact on physical labor
flows into the United States as measured by the
number of temporary nonimmigrant workers. In terms
of size, the estimated effects in Table 4 are also smaller
compared to the estimated effects in Table 3. This
might be expected since, as explained before, physical
labor mobility faces more substantial practical
restrictions compared to digital labor flows. Similar to

Table 3, it is not surprising that including fixed effects
increases the pseudo R-squared in Table 4 from 0.0133
to 0.982, since fixed effects control for a large number
of unobserved factors.
The regressions in Table 4 control for the evolution
of the price index within workers’ countries to
facilitate the comparison between the results in Tables
3 and 4. Similar to the results in Table 3, the estimated
coefficient on the price index variable in Table 4 is
positive, which supports the conclusion that workers

9

there is a practical limitation arising from the limited data
availability at the monthly level.

Fixed effects regressions also limit the inclusion of variables with
little variation during our study period (e.g., population). In addition,
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from countries facing poor labor market conditions are
more likely to seek employment abroad.

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate how digital and
physical labor flows respond to monetary incentives
using information on online labor exchanges between
workers and employers from a major global online
labor platform for IT services, in conjunction with
information on physical labor flows into the United
States from the Department of Homeland Security.
Our empirical analysis uses exogenous changes in the
exchange rate as a source of identification. We argue
that a depreciation of a country’s currency against the
US dollar increases the incentives of its workers to
seek employment from employers based in the United
States.
Our empirical results suggest that monetary
incentives, measured as a depreciation of the exchange
rate of a country’s currency against the US dollar, have
a substantial impact on the supply of labor in virtual
markets: in our most comprehensive regressions that
include fixed effects by country and month, we have
found that the estimated elasticity of the labor supply
in virtual markets amounts to 0.89. Conversely, we do
not find that monetary incentives have a statistically
significant impact on the physical labor flows into the
United States, which might be expected since physical
migration faces substantial bureaucratic restrictions
and transaction costs.
Prior empirical estimates show that restrictions to
physical labor migration generate massive inefficiency
costs, and our results in this study suggest that online
labor markets have the potential to reduce these
deadweight losses. Specifically, online labor markets
have the potential to reduce the inefficiency costs
imposed by the legal restrictions to physical migration
because in online labor markets workers and
employers can circumvent the bureaucratic deterrents
to mutually beneficial working relationships. Despite
the importance of investigating and quantifying the
elasticity of the labor supply in online markets and of
examining how digital labor markets can help reduce
the costs imposed by bureaucratic restrictions to
physical migration, there is surprisingly little research
on this topic. There is obviously a need for more
research to be in a position to accurately predict the
degree to which Internet labor markets can ameliorate
the inefficiency costs generated by the bureaucratic
restrictions to physical labor migration, and we believe
our paper is a first step in that direction.
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